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JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
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NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
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NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

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TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

- ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-042.
- ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 20, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

¶3. (S) The sixth Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group (WG) meeting, chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov, continued a review of joint draft text (JDT) of the CorE provisions. The sides agreed to send Section V (CorE of Heavy Bombers) to conforming, albeit with brackets. Section VII (Elimination of Fixed Structures) was discussed; the United States accepted the Russian proposal not to eliminate the reinforced concrete pad of the fixed structure, while proposing new language prohibiting building anything on or over the remaining pad.

¶4. (S) Section III (ICBM Launcher Elimination) text was discussed briefly, followed by a lengthy dialogue on the views of both sides with respect to mobile launcher CorE. The Russian side offered that it regularly recycles scrap and other materials from eliminated mobile launchers. Section II (ICBM and SLBM Elimination) was discussed briefly followed by a statement from Russia that it wished to sell eliminated launch canisters to road construction firms to use as road

reinforcement culverts. End Summary.

15. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section V to Conforming; Section VII-Some Agreement and Some Brackets; Section III: Tip-toe Through the Mobile Mle; A Long Discussion on Mobile Launchers; A Greener Russia: We Recycle Our Mobile Launchers; Section III Redux; Road-Building With Our Missile Canisters.

SECTION V TO CONFORMING

16. (S) The sides discussed paragraph 5 of Section V of the CorE Protocol on Heavy Bomber Conversion. Elliott proposed that the time period a heavy bomber be made available for inspection should be 30 days and that the converted heavy bomber could be removed from its viewing area after the completion of an inspection: "If an inspection of the converted heavy bomber took place on day 2, it makes no sense for the heavy bomber to sit for another 28 days." Ryzhkov agreed and asked Elliott whether text covering the time period of inspections could be moved to Section I: General Provisions (GP). Elliot objected and reminded Ryzhkov that each time period was process-specific, so having one overall statement on an inspection time period was not appropriate. After some consideration, the Russian side agreed, and upon Elliot's review of the final language of paragraph 5, suggested the text be moved to the Conforming Group. Elliott approved.

17. (S) Before concluding Section V, Elliott made a case for a 60-day window to allow national technical means (NTM) of verification to operate. Ryzhkov demurred and asked that this paragraph (paragraph 2) remain bracketed. Both sides agreed that subparagraph 4c was agreed and that the entire text was ready to conform, even though some brackets remained. Ryzhkov commented that Russia might be able to agree to a 60-day window for heavy bombers, since they could be removed at any time for scrapping. Russia would continue to insist on a 45-day window for silos, however, because a silo could only be graded in situ. Moreover, a silo was always visible to NTM.

SECTION VII-SOME AGREEMENT AND SOME BRACKETS

18. (S) Both sides agreed to delete paragraph 1 of Section VII as it repeated text found in Section I: General Provisions. Ryzhkov made a case that eliminated facilities be subject to confirmatory inspections; he cited text in paragraph 6 of the General Provisions Section and Treaty Article VII that he believed made the case for these inspections. Elliott agreed to check with U.S. members of the Inspection Protocol WG (IPWG) on the issue. Ryzhkov continued, stating that these confirmatory inspections would build confidence, though he doubted either side would use such inspections under the low quotas that Russia had proposed. Elliott reminded Ryzhkov that the U.S. side included no quotas for these confirmatory inspections in its proposal and that the IPWG chairs would need to make the final decision.

19. (S) A discussion of ICBM emplacement equipment ensued, with the Russian side making the case that references to this equipment be removed from Section VII. Ryzhkov informed the U.S. side that Russia did not station ICBM emplacement equipment near its silos but would bring the vehicle from another area to load a missile when required. The vehicle would then return to its base. He made the case to Elliott that if the silo was destroyed it made no difference whether the emplacement equipment remained by the silo or not. Elliott agreed to revisit this issue at the next WG meeting, and Ryzhkov stated that Russia would accept the paragraph with or without that language.

¶10. (S) Elliott proposed new language for Section VII, paragraph 2; it specified that the reinforced concrete pad could remain after a fixed structure for mobile launchers was eliminated, but that no new structures, either temporary or permanent, be built over the reinforced concrete pad. Ryzhkov acknowledged the U.S. compromise on the concrete pad issue, but asked that the paragraph be bracketed due to the new U.S. proposal requiring no new structures over the concrete pads. Elliott agreed to provide the Russian side with an updated version of Section VII based on this discussion.

SECTION III: TIP-TOE
THROUGH THE MOBILE MELEE

¶11. (S) The sides reiterated that paragraphs 1-3 of Section III had been agreed upon previously. Ryzhkov asked that paragraph 4 be bracketed and argued much of paragraph 4 was a repeat of the General Provisions Section. Elliott sought comment from Ryzhkov on paragraphs 5, 6, and 7. (Begin comment: All three are U.S.-proposed paragraphs on mobile launcher elimination. End comment.) Ryzhkov requested that paragraph 5 on inspections be bracketed. A discussion ensued between Ryzhkov and Elliott on the procedures each side had proposed for mobile launcher elimination. Ryzhkov confirmed that Russia now proposed to remove both the erector-launcher mechanism and the stabilizing jacks (leveling supports), but did not want to cut off the aft 0.78 meters of the vehicle chassis. Russia had decided it would be necessary to replace the stabilizing jacks in any case to convert eliminated launchers into cranes.

A LONG DISCUSSION ON MOBILE LAUNCHERS

¶12. (S) Elliott provided the U.S. viewpoint on mobile launcher elimination, stating that while the new treaty would not have the strict verification provisions that START did, certain minimal verification provisions were necessary. Specifically, on-site verification of final mobile launcher elimination procedures was necessary. He added that the U.S. side had moved substantially from its original positions on mobile launcher elimination and repeated that minimum verification provisions were essential for the United States to move forward: "NTM simply cannot substitute for inspection of mobile launcher elimination."

¶13. (S) Ryzhkov countered Elliott's remarks with his bottom line: "Do you think the Russian side will cheat? The two sides have different approaches and requirements for verification. The two Parties will have an opportunity to verify anything at any moment. How could we cheat under this regime?" Elliott countered by asking whether, in theory, mobile launchers could be re-configured after a conversion much in the same way that a heavy bomber could, in theory, be re-configured to deliver nuclear weapons after a conversion. Both Ryzhkov and Mr. Smirnov provided a detailed explanation of why re-configuring a mobile launcher was difficult if not impossible. Moreover, launchers being eliminated had already exceeded their guaranteed service life. Elliott retorted with his bottom line: "As we strive to make the procedures less intrusive so the launcher can be used again, it becomes more plausible that the launcher could be re-configured. This is why if the inspectors see the cuts to the launcher being made there is no question that the launcher has been eliminated."

¶14. (S) Ryzhkov countered that for both sides, there was always the opportunity to re-configure a converted SSBN or heavy bomber. He pointed out that non-mobile missile elimination had no verification provisions but neither side had issues with this; each Party had to live up to its treaty obligations and the option to verify one another's activities

provided the necessary confidence and deterrence to cheating.

Smirnov added that the Russian side would maintain current START elimination procedures for future eliminations. Elliott proffered that the Russian side could undertake many

of the preliminary elimination procedures ahead of the inspection, leaving the final mounting bracket cut for the inspectors to observe, thereby reducing the time inspectors would be in country. Smirnov agreed that the time needed to make the final mounting bracket cut on each mobile launcher was in the range of 1 to 2 hours. He acknowledged that, in theory, 4 to 5 launchers could be eliminated in 1 day.

A GREENER RUSSIA: WE RECYCLE OUR MOBILE LAUNCHERS

¶15. (S) Smirnov related that the Russian side regularly recycled many items from eliminated mobile launchers--some items went to scrap purchasers, some items were removed and retained. He indicated that the scrap business was lucrative and many people were likely to seek to purchase eliminated launchers.

¶16. (S) Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether Russia would consider using unique identifiers (UIDs) on its mobile launchers. Ryzhkov demurred and repeated that the sides had different approaches and the U.S. "extra provisions to confirm eliminated items" were unnecessary. Smirnov provided an oft-repeated phrase: "What was important was seeing the result of the elimination, not the process of elimination."

SECTION III REDUX

¶17. (S) The sides returned to Section III, paragraph 8. The Russian side did not object to the U.S.-proposed language that eliminated vehicles may be used only for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty, but said it required further study. Ryzhkov asked whether paragraph 8 of the U.S. version could be combined with paragraph 5 of the Russian version of the General Provisions Section. Elliott agreed to consider it.

ROAD-BUILDING WITH OUR MISSILE CANISTERS

¶18. (S) The sides discussed their work for the next WG meeting and agreed to discuss Section II: Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs. Elliott provided the U.S. position with respect to ICBM and SLBMs: Only the first stage must be eliminated but inspectors should be given the right to observe the final cut. The elimination of the second and third stages could take place without inspectors present. Lastly, launch canisters were to be destroyed or cut. This precipitated a lengthy response by Ryzhkov and Smirnov on how launch canisters, like mobile launchers, could be re-used for other purposes. Ryzhkov admitted that his previous argument that launch canisters could be reutilized as grain silos was not feasible, but proposed that, in the canisters' case, they could be used for road building. Because of the canisters' strength and durability, road builders wanted to purchase launch canisters in their entirety and place them under road surfaces to be used as culverts. Smirnov offered that if the canisters were cut or damaged, they could not be re-used for road construction

projects. Elliott made a point that the U.S. side would not accept this and that an uncut or undamaged launch canister had the ability to house a missile. Ryzhkov also raised a concern about the U.S. proposal. He stated that Russia often will burn the propellant, and by doing so, the need to perform a cut on the casing was negated. Elliott stated he understood their technical point and would ask additional

questions at the next meeting.

¶19. (S) Ryzhkov countered that Russian launch canisters were equal to U.S. loading tubes, which also should be eliminated.

Elliott replied that was not the case, as a U.S. loading tube could not launch a missile whereas a launch canister could, moreover, the United States did not maintain a one-to-one ratio between missiles and loading tubes. Ryzhkov replied that the issue would have to be discussed in detail at a future meeting.

¶20. (S) Documents exchanged: None

¶21. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
LCDR Brons
Mr. Broshar
Mr. Dwyer
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Russia

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Voloskov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS